Abstract
Introduction
Movement and migration are key factors in solving the puzzle of the evolution of cooperation. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the individuals of a population prefer to interact with, and indeed benefit from interacting with, cooperative players than with those who would try to exploit them. The inclusion of movement creates a more realistic framework than those adopted in some of the traditional, static, spatial models [1, 2] .
Several mechanisms for the emergence of cooperation exist, but all essentially express a need for cooperators to either avoid interactions with defectors or increase and sustain those with other cooperators. Research in this domain is largely divided into two categories based on their definition of mobility; that all movement should be random [4] , or that movement is purposeful or strategically driven, but may indeed contain random elements [3, 5] . In our opinion, until now an uncomplicated contingent movement strategy has yet to be adequately described in the literature.
In this research, we investigate the Follow-Flee strategy and present a comparison to the well-known Walk-Away strategy proposed by Aktipis [3] . The Follow Flee strategy [6] is a contingent movement strategy that enables agents to form and sustain clusters by following nearby cooperators, and to flee from invading defectors. We adopt an evolutionary model whereby agents obtaining higher payoffs in the Prisoner's Dilemma game [1] replace those with lower payoffs. Both strategies first compete on their own against a Naïve (or random) strategy and are then evaluated together. These strategies are studied in a range of environments while varying a number of parameters including population density, and some evolutionary settings. We demonstrate that Follow-Flee outperforms Walk-Away at every level of comparison, and does so with quite a large margin. We hypothesise that this is due to Follow-Flee's ability to maintain mutually cooperative, spatial relationships despite the pressure from defectors, and its ability to effectively maximise an agent's potential payoff in the next round.
Methodology

Environment & Agent Representation
The population of agents inhabit a toroidal shaped diluted lattice, where each cell can be occupied by up to one agent. The game played by agents is the Prisoner's Dilemma, and agents will either always cooperate or always defect. At each time step, agents compete in a single round of the game with each of their nearest eight neighbours. Following this interaction phase, agents have the opportunity to take one step into an adjacent free cell according to their movement policy. Isolated agents will take one step in a random direction.
Movement Strategies
1. Follow-Flee has two rules: (1) move to a cell adjacent to a neighbouring cooperator, and (2) move to a cell non-adjacent to a nearby defector. This strategy emerged as a result of a study that used a genetic algorithm to co-evolve mobility and cooperation [6] . 2. Walk-Away instructs agents to (1) move to a cell non-adjacent to nearby defectors, or (2) stay still to continue to interact with neighbouring cooperators. 3. Naïve agents move to an empty adjacent cell without regard to the actions of its neighbours.
Evolutionary Dynamics
The reproduction and death mechanisms of this study will be determined by two variables: G and D. The number of time-steps per generation is determined by G, the sampling rate; and the number of agents replicated after each generation is determined by D, the reproduction rate. In a single generation, agents will accumulate their payoffs received from playing the game, and this is used as a measure of fitness. At the end of each generation, the agents are ranked according to their fitness score. The bottom D% will die and the top D% will replicate creating an exact copy of themselves. Following reproduction, the fitness score of the whole population will be reset and the next generation will begin.
Experimental Results
In our simulations, we compare and contrast the performances of the strategies Follow-Flee and WalkAway. In the first experiment, both strategies compete separately against the Naïve strategy, and afterwards compete head-to-head. In the second experiment, we vary both the sampling rate G, and the reproduction rate D, over a wide range of values while testing the success of both strategies. To obtain a sufficient sample each simulation is run 100 times.
Tab 1: % of Simulations where a Strategy Dominates
Strategy
Vs. Naïve Vs. Rival
As is shown in Tab 1, Follow-Flee vastly outperforms the Walk-Away movement strategy in terms of enabling cooperation to emerge and dominate the population. Against the Naïve strategy, the Walk-Away strategy only becomes dominant and induces cooperation in 28% of simulations, whereas in this environment Follow-Flee produces this success in 97% of the equivalent simulations. When both strategies compete in the same simulation, cooperation is evolved in 100% of simulations. Follow-Flee is adopted in 73% of those simulations, Walk-Away emerges in 10% of simulations, and the remaining 17% end in a coalition between the two strategies. These results indicate that the FollowFlee cooperators exhibit the ability to invade the WalkAway strategy. This is significant because there should be no selective bias between two mutually cooperative strategies.
In Fig. 1 and 2 , we see the percentage of simulations that result in cooperator dominance as we vary G and D. Across the majority of the parameter space, Follow-Flee outperforms Walk-Away in terms of promoting the evolution of cooperation. Walk-Away has more success in spreading cooperation at the lowest values of G and D, but across the remainder of the space it performs relatively poorly. On the other hand, Follow-Flee dramatically improves upon its poor performance in very low parameter settings, and manages to almost completely counteract the influence of defectors. 
Conclusion
In every experiment, Walk-Away was outperformed by our Follow-Flee strategy by significant margins; demonstrating that (1) Follow-Flee is more resistant to the invasion of defectors, (2) it produces a greater percentage of cooperators victories in a wider range of evolutionary settings, (3) it is more successful in denser environments, and (4) can invade Walk-Away despite the fact that both are mutually cooperative strategies.
We attribute the success of Follow-Flee to its highly mobile, proactive nature, and hypothesise that it is possible for it to make such significant gains due to its ability to generate and maintain cooperative clusters. The Follow-Flee cooperators actively seek out new mutually cooperative interactions, and knowingly maintain these beneficial relationships when pursued by defectors.
Future work will involve investigating the robustness of the Follow-Flee strategy to invasion by defectors, and to explore potential applications in swarm robotics.
